On 30 June 2026, Outokumpu, SSAB, Salzgitter, Saarstahl and Dillinger published a joint statement on ETS1 and CBAM at the European Parliament. In the statement, they confirmed that they are committing more than €10 billion in capital expenditure to low-emission production and modernzed assets in Europe.
The statement sets out a clear political position on the investment conditions required for low-emission steel production. The five steel producers call on the EU to keep the ETS1 Linear Reduction Factor at 4.4% at least until 2035, maintain both the CBAM factor and the free allocation phase-out trajectory and prevent the Market Stability Reserve from being used to artificially increase the supply of allowances. These requests directly affect the credibility of the carbon price. A lower or politically weakened ETS price would change the expected performance of low-emission production routes. A steelmaker investing in electric arc furnaces, direct reduced iron plants, hydrogen-ready equipment, energy efficiency or plant modernization must assess future operating costs, carbon costs, customer demand and import competition before committing capital.

The statement also separates carbon pricing from the main operating pressures facing European steel producers. Lowering the ETS signal would simply change the projected carbon cost path for European plants that are already making decarbonization investments. The CBAM section then turns the ETS argument into a trade exposure argument. If European producers pay a real carbon cost, imported steel must face an equivalent carbon constraint. Otherwise, EU producers carry the carbon price while imported material can still enter the EU through products, routes or practices that avoid comparable exposure. For this reason, the statement identifies three priorities for CBAM implementation.
First: add steel-intensive downstream products. Downstream coverage is the first gap to monitor. If steel-intensive products outside the current scope of CBAM can be imported without equivalent treatment, production may shift from covered primary steel to less-covered downstream goods. This would reduce the effectiveness of CBAM, even if upstream reporting for steel were effective.
The second is to prevent abusive practices before they occur. CBAM relies on product classification, embodied emissions data, production route documentation and import documentation. If importers can route, classify or document products in ways that avoid the expected carbon cost, compliant EU producers face a regulatory cost that competitors can partially escape.
Third: the importance of developing a permanent solution for exports. EU steel producers selling outside the EU may face a carbon cost that foreign competitors do not face in the same target market. Without an export solution, part of the justification for low-emission investment depends solely on the EU internal market.

The statement also calls for ETS1 revenues to be reinvested in industrial decarbonization, with a focus on CBAM sectors. This links the carbon pricing mechanism to investment support. If EU steelmakers contribute to the ETS while also investing in low-emission plants, reinvesting revenues in industrial decarbonization can reduce the capital gap without weakening the carbon signal.
A steelmaker can invest more than €10bn in low-emission assets only if the policy framework protects the logic of that investment: a predictable ETS price, a CBAM that limits carbon leakage, infrastructure that lowers operating constraints, and revenue recycling that supports capital-heavy industrial conversion.

For buyers, the same framework affects future supply. A credible ETS-CBAM system gives procurement teams a clearer basis for comparing EU low-emission supply, imported material and future carbon-cost exposure in the same sourcing file.